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Abstract
We study the impact of financial market development on industrial pollution in a large
panel of countries and industries over the period 1974-2013. We find a strong positive
impact of credit markets, but a strong negative impact of stock markets, on aggregate
CO2 emissions per capita. Industry-level analysis shows that stock market development
(but not credit market development) is associated with cleaner production processes
in technologically “dirty” industries. These industries also produce more green patents
as stock markets develop. Moreover, our results suggest that stock markets (credit
markets) reallocate investment towards more (less) carbon-efficient sectors. Together,
these findings indicate that the evolution of a country’s financial structure helps explain
the non-linear relationship between economic development and environmental quality
documented in the literature.
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1 Introduction
The 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP21) has put finance firmly at the heart of the debate on
environmental degradation. The leaders of the G20 stated their intention to scale up so-called green-
finance initiatives to fund low-carbon infrastructure and other climate solutions. A key example is
the burgeoning market for green bonds to finance projects that save energy, reduce carbon emissions,
or curtail pollution more generally. Other green-finance initiatives include the establishment of the
British Green Investment Bank, which specializes in projects related to environmental preservation,
and the creation of a green-credit department by the largest bank in the world—ICBC in China.
Similar initiatives are being developed by many other industrialized and developing countries.
Somewhat paradoxically, the interest in green finance has also laid bare our limited under-
standing of the relation between regular finance and environmental pollution. To date, no rigorous
empirical evidence exists on how finance affects industrial pollution as economies grow. Are well-
developed banking sectors and stock markets detrimental to the environment as they fuel growth
and the concomitant emission of pollutants? Or can financial development steer economies towards
more sustainable growth by favoring clean industries over dirty ones? These are pertinent ques-
tions because most of the global transition to a low-carbon economy will need to be funded by the
private financial sector if international climate goals are to be met on time (UNEP, 2011). A better
understanding of how banks and stock markets affect carbon emissions can also help policy-makers
to benchmark the ability of special green-finance initiatives to reduce such emissions.
To analyze the mechanisms that connect financial development, industrial composition and envi-
ronmental degradation—as measured by the emission of CO2—we exploit a 53-country, 16-industry,
40-year panel.1 To preview our results, we find a strong positive impact of credit markets, but a
strong negative impact of stock markets, on aggregate CO2 emissions per capita. Additional find-
ings indicate that industries that pollute more for intrinsic, technological reasons emit more carbon
dioxide when credit markets develop. We find that stock markets have the opposite effect: indus-
tries that pollute more for technological reasons, produce relatively less carbon dioxide where and
when stock markets grow. Our analysis also sheds light on the mechanisms that underpin these re-
1CO2 emissions are widely considered to be the main source of global warming as they account for over half
of all radiative forcing (net solar retention) by the earth (IPCC, 1990; 2007). The monitoring and regulation of
anthropogenic CO2 emissions is therefore at the core of international climate negotiations. CO2 emissions also proxy
for other air pollutants caused by fossil fuels such as methane, carbon monoxide, SO2, and nitrous oxides.
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sults. In particular, we show that while stock markets facilitate the adoption of cleaner technologies
in polluting industries, the opposite holds true for credit markets. Auxiliary evidence from sectoral
patenting data confirms that deeper stock markets (credit markets) are associated with more (less)
green innovation in traditionally polluting industries, as well as with lower (higher) rates of new
business creation in such industries. Moreover, our results suggest that—holding cross-industry
differences in technology constant—stock markets (credit markets) tend to reallocate investment
towards more (less) carbon-efficient sectors. Lastly, we find that the reduction in pollution in
industries with a high natural propensity to pollute, as a result of domestic stock market develop-
ment, is not mirrored by a proportionate increase in pollution by the same industries in emerging
economies. This suggests that stock markets have a genuine cleansing effect on polluting indus-
tries and do not simply help such industries to outsource “dirty” technologies to pollution havens.
These empirical regularities are robust to controlling for a host of potential confounding factors,
such as general economic development, country-industry fixed effects, and unobservable country
and industry trends.
This paper contributes to (and connects) two strands of the literature. First, we inform the
debate on economic development and environmental pollution. This literature has focused mostly
on the environmental Kuznets hypothesis, according to which pollution increases at early stages of
development but declines once a country surpasses a certain income level. Two main mechanisms
underlie this hypothesis. First, during the early stages of development, a move from agriculture
to manufacturing and heavy industry is associated with both higher incomes and more pollution
per capita. After some point, however, the structure of the economy moves towards light industry
and services, and this shift goes hand-in-hand with a levelling off or even a reduction in pollution.2
Second, when economies develop, breakthroughs at the technological frontier (or the adoption of
technologies from more advanced countries) may substitute clean for dirty technologies and reduce
pollution per unit of output (within a given sector).
While empirical work provides evidence for a Kuznets curve for a variety of pollutants, the
evidence for CO2 emissions is mixed.
3 Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson (1998) find an inverse U-
2Hettige, Lucas and Wheeler (1992) and Hettige, Mani and Wheeler (2000) find that the sectoral composition of
an economy gets cleaner when a country reaches middle-income status and moves towards less-polluting services.
3Grossman and Krueger (1995) find a Kuznets curve for urban air pollution and the contamination of river basins.
For a critical review of empirical research on the environmental Kuznets curve, see Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang and
Wheeler (2002).
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curve in the relationship between per capita GDP and CO2 emissions while Holtz-Eakin and Selden
(1995) show that CO2 emissions go up with per capita GDP but merely stabilize when economies
reach a certain income level. Our contribution is to explore the role of finance in shaping the
relation between economic growth and carbon emissions. Empirical evidence on the diffusion of
low-carbon technologies is still lacking (Burke et al., 2016) and our findings shed light on the role
of finance in this regard.
More specifically, we assess how banks and stock markets affect the two main mechanisms that
underpin the Kuznets hypothesis: a shift towards less-polluting sectors and an innovation-driven
reduction in pollution within sectors. A move towards greener technologies can involve substantial
investments and therefore be conditional on the availability of external finance.4 Schumpeterian
growth models, such as Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), suggest that financial constraints
can prevent firms in less-developed countries from exploiting R&D that was carried out in countries
closer to the technological frontier. Financial development can then facilitate the absorption of
state-of-the art technologies and help mitigate environmental pollution.
Second, our results also contribute to the literature on the relationship between financial struc-
ture and economic development. A substantial body of empirical evidence has by now established
that growing financial systems contribute to economic growth in a causal sense.5 While earlier find-
ings suggest that the structure of the financial system—bank-based versus market-based—matters
little for its ability to stimulate growth (Beck and Levine, 2002), more recent research qualifies this
finding by showing that the impact of banking on growth declines (and the impact of securities
markets on growth increases) as national income rises (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Feyen and Levine, 2013;
Gambacorta, Yang and Tsatsaronis, 2014). Our contribution is to assess whether the structure
of the financial system matters for the degree of environmental degradation that accompanies the
process of economic development.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the main arguments as to
why banks and stock markets may have a different impact on industrial pollution. Section 3 then
4Levine et al. (2018) show how positive credit supply shocks in US counties, stemming from increased fracking of
shale oil in other counties, reduce local air pollution. At the firm level, the authors confirm that a relaxation of credit
constraints is associated with a decline in emitted toxic air pollutants. In a similar vein, Goetz (2018) finds that
financially constrained firms reduced toxic emissions when their capital cost decreased as a result of the US Maturity
Extension Program.
5For comprehensive surveys of this literature, see Levine (2005), Beck (2008), and Popov (2018).
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presents our empirical methodology, after which Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 then
presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of our main findings.
2 Banks, stock markets, and industrial pollution
Financial structure, the relative importance of credit versus stock markets, matters if different
forms of finance affect industrial pollution to a different extent or through different channels. Sev-
eral theoretical arguments suggest that banks may be less suited to reducing industrial pollution
than stock markets. First, banks are “dirtier” financiers to the extent that they are technologi-
cally conservative: they may fear that funding new (and possibly cleaner) technologies erodes the
value of the collateral that underlies existing loans, which mostly represent old (dirtier) technolo-
gies (Minetti, 2011). Second, banks can also hesitate to finance green technologies if the related
innovation involves assets that are intangible, firm-specific, and linked to human capital (Hall and
Lerner, 2010). Such assets are difficult to redeploy elsewhere and therefore hard to collateralize
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Third, banks may also simply lack the skills to assess (green)
technologies at the early stages of adoption (Ueda, 2004). In line with this skeptical view of banks
as financiers of innovative technologies, Hsu, Tian and Xu (2014) provide cross-country evidence
that industries that depend on external finance and are high-tech intensive are less (more) likely
to file patents in countries with better developed credit (equity) markets. Fourth, banks typically
operate with a shorter time horizon (the loan maturity) as compared with equity investors and are
hence less interested in whether funded assets will become less valuable (or even stranded) in the
more distant future. Ongena, Delis and de Greiff (2018) show that banks only very recently (after
2015) started to price the climate-policy risk of lending to firms with large fossil fuel reserves.6
In contrast, stock markets may be better suited to finance innovative (and greener) industries.
Equity contracts are more appropriate to finance green innovations that are characterized by both
high risks and high potential returns.7 Equity investors may also care more about future pollu-
6Dasgupta, Laplante, Wang and Wheeler (2002) argue that banks may refuse to lend to a firm if they are worried
about environmental liability. This indicates that screening by banks helps to weed out at least the (visibly) most
polluting industries. Indeed, recent anecdotal evidence (Zeller, 2010) suggests that banks have started to scrutinize
the dirtiest industries more as they fear the financial and reputational repercussions of lending to such firms. Yet,
this narrow focus on reputational risk and environmental liability does not preclude banks with a short-term horizon
from lending to less visibly polluting industries, such as those producing large amounts of greenhouse gases.
7Brown, Martinsson and Petersen (2017) show that while credit markets mainly foster growth in industries that
rely on external finance for physical capital accumulation, equity markets have a comparative advantage in financing
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tion so that stock prices rationally discount future cash flows of polluting industries.8 Empirical
evidence shows that stock markets indeed punish firms that perform badly in environmental terms
(such as after environmental accidents) (Salinger, 1992) and reward those that do well in terms of
environmental friendliness (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). Chava (2014) shows that firms with
environmental concerns also tend to have fewer institutional owners.
In all, we conjecture that stock markets facilitate the adoption of cleaner technologies in pol-
luting industries, while we expect no or less of such a role for credit markets. Ultimately, however,
whether banks or stock markets are better suited to limiting or even reducing environmental pollu-
tion remains an empirical question.9 The aim of this paper is therefore to provide robust empirical
evidence on how, and how much, banks and stock markets contribute to carbon emissions at both
the country and the industry level.
3 Empirical Methodology
We begin by estimating a regression where we map financial markets development into carbon
dioxide emissions and where we use a country as the unit of observation. In the process, we
distinguish between the effect of developments in credit markets and the effect of developments in
stock markets. We estimate the following specification:
CO2c,t
Populationc,t
= β1Creditc,t−1 + β2Stockc,t−1 + β3Xc,t−1 + ϕc + φt + εc,t (1)
where
CO2c,t
Populationc,t
denotes total per capita emissions of carbon dioxide in country c during year
t. Creditc,t−1 is total credit extended to the private sector by deposit money banks and other credit
institutions, normalized by GDP, in country c during year t− 1. Stockc,t−1 is the total value of all
technology-led growth. In line with this, Kim and Weisbach (2008) find that a majority of the funds that firms raise
in public stock issues is invested in R&D.
8For instance, oil company ExxonMobil recently gave in to investor demand for more disclosure of the impact of
climate policies on the firm’s future activities (Financial Times, 2017). A stock-market listing may nevertheless lead
to short-termism and distorted investment decisions if firm managers believe that equity investors do not properly
value long-term projects (Narayanan, 1985; Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2015).
9Chava (2014) shows how the environmental profile of a firm affects both the cost of its equity and its debt capital,
suggesting that both banks and equity investors take environmental concerns into account. Higher capital costs can
be an important channel through which investor concerns affect firm behavior and their pollution intensity. If higher
capital costs outweigh the cost of greening the production structure, firms will switch to a more expensive but less
polluting technology (Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner, 2001).
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listed shares, normalized by GDP, in country c during year t− 1. Arguably, countries with deeper
credit markets also tend to have more mature stock markets, which is reflected in an unconditional
correlation between Creditc,t and Stockc,t of 0.5. Nevertheless, the two variables capture qualita-
tively different developments—debt finance versus equity finance—which have different theoretical
implications for the adoption of dirty versus clean technologies. Xc,t−1 denotes a vector of time-
varying country-specific variables. Lastly, ϕc is a vector of country dummies; φt is a vector of year
dummies; and εc,t is an idiosyncratic error term.
The vector X includes factors that can account for a sizeable portion of the variation in cross-
country CO2 emissions. One such factor is economic development, the pollution impact of which
can be positive at early stages of development as the economy utilizes the cheapest technologies
available, and negative at later stages when the economy innovates to reduce pollution (the envi-
ronmental Kuznets-curve argument). We account for this by including the logarithm of per-capita
GDP, both on its own and squared. Another factor is macroeconomic stability, which we capture
by including the level of inflation on the right-hand side of the regression. The phase of the business
cycle can also have an impact on pollution levels. For example, the economy may cleanse itself
from obsolete technologies during recessions. To account for this, we include proxies for recessions
and for systemic banking crises.10 Lastly, country dummies allow us to net out the impact of
unobservable country-specific time-invariant influences, such as comparative advantage or appetite
for regulation. The inclusion of year dummies helps to purge our estimates from the effect of un-
observable global trends common to all countries in the dataset, such as the “Great Moderation”
or the adoption of a new technology across countries around the same time.
Interpreting the results from Eq. (1) as causal rests on the assumption that financial devel-
opment is unaffected by current or expected per-capita pollution levels, and that pollution and
financial development are not affected by a common factor. The latter assumption is particularly
10Caballero and Hammour (1994) provide a vintage model in which production units that embody the latest
technology are continuously being produced as innovation proceeds. At the same time, outdated units with inferior
technology are continuously being destroyed. During a recession, outdated units are most likely to turn unprofitable
and to be scrapped. (A related idea is the “pit-stop” view of recessions, according to which recessions stimulate
productivity-improving activities because of their temporarily low opportunity costs (Gali and Hammour, 1991)).
We argue that recessions may also involve an environmental cleansing effect as inferior-technology companies are
typically also the least energy efficient ones. A recession will then prune these companies and hence improve the
energy efficiency of the average (surviving) firm. Any such positive effects may be partly counterbalanced, however,
if renewable energy investments are put on hold, thus delaying the introduction of cleaner technologies. Indeed,
Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) show that firms that were financially constrained during the global financial
crisis cut spending on technology and capital investments and bypassed attractive investment opportunities.
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questionable. For example, if global demand increases, particularly for the type of products that
are produced by technologically “dirty” industries, CO2 emissions and financial depth will increase
simultaneously without there necessarily being a causal link from finance to pollution.
We address this point by employing a cross-country, cross-industry regression framework where
we assess the relative impact of within-country financial development on different types of industries,
depending on their technological propensity to pollute. We estimate the following model:
CO2c,s,t
Populationc,t
= β1Creditc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys + β2Stockc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys
+β3Xc,s,t−1 + ϕc,s + φc,t + θs,t + εc,s,t
(2)
where
CO2c,s,t
Populationc,t
denotes total per-capita emissions of carbon dioxide by industry s in country c
during year t. As in Model (1), Creditc,t−1 is total credit extended to the private sector by deposit
money banks and other credit institutions, normalized by GDP, in country c during year t − 1,
and Stockc,t−1 is the total value of all listed shares, normalized by GDP, in country c during year
t − 1. Pollution intensitys is a time-invariant, sector-specific variable that measures the average
carbon dioxide emissions of sector s per unit of value added, in the global sample during the sample
period. The underlying assumption is that the global average of a sector’s emissions per unit of
output captures the sector’s global propensity to pollute. In robustness tests, we also employ a
proxy for Pollution intensitys that captures average carbon dioxide emissions by the respective
sector in the United States, over the sample period, and one based on the industry’s global average
air pollution per employee.
In the most saturated version of Model (1), we control for Xc,s,t−1, a vector of interactions
between industry characteristics and country factors. For a start, we control for the interaction
between the industry benchmark for pollution intensity and a host of time-varying country-specific
factors which capture the extent of economic development (GDP per capita), the size of the market
(population), and the business cycle (inflation, whether the country is experiencing a recession,
and whether the country is experiencing a banking crisis). This test is aimed at controlling for the
possibility that the impact of financial development on pollution is contaminated by concurrent
developments in the country’s economy. We also control for interactions of the country’s credit
and stock markets with other natural industrial benchmarks, such as the industry’s dependence
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on external financing, the industry’s growth opportunities, and the industry’s asset tangibility. All
these tests aim to control for the possibility that pollution intensity captures a different property
of the industrial composition via which the effect of financial markets manifests itself.
Lastly, we saturate the empirical specification with interactions of country and sector dummies
(ϕc,s), interactions of country and year dummies (φc,t), and interactions of sector and year dummies
(θs,t). ϕc,s nets out all variation that is specific to a sector in a country and does not change over
time (e.g., the comparative advantage of agriculture in France). φc,t eliminates the impact of
unobservable, time-varying factors that are common to all industries within a country (e.g., the
population’s demand for regulation). Lastly, θs,t controls for all variation that is coming from
unobservable, time-varying factors that are specific to an industry and common to all countries
(e.g., technological development in air transport).
In the next two steps, we test for the channels through which financial development affects
overall pollution. In particular, we study the impact of financial development on (1) between-
industry reallocation and (2) within-industry innovation. The first mechanism is one whereby some
types of financial markets are better at reallocating investment away from technologically “dirty”
towards technologically “clean” industries, holding technology constant. The second mechanism
is one whereby—holding the industrial structure constant—some types of financial markets are
better at improving the energy efficiency of technologically “dirty” industries, bringing them closer
to their technological frontier.
We evaluate the first hypothesis using the following regression model:
∆V alue addedc,s,t = β1Creditc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys + β2Stockc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys
+β3Xc,s,t−1 + ϕc,s + φc,t + θs,t + εc,s,t
(3)
where relative to Model (2), the only change is that the dependent variable denotes the percent-
age change in value added between year t− 1 and year t by industry s in country c. The evolution
of this variable over time thus measures the industry’s growth relative to other industries in the
country. This therefore captures the degree of reallocation that takes place in the economy from
technologically dirty towards technologically clean industries. Earlier work has shown how well-
developed stock and credit markets make countries more responsive to global common shocks by
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allowing firms to better take advantage of time-varying sectoral growth opportunities (Fisman and
Love, 2007). Financially developed countries increase investment more (less) in growing (declining)
industries (Wurgler, 2000).
We evaluate the second hypothesis in two ways. First, we estimate the regression model:
CO2c,s,t
V alue addedc,s,t
= β1Creditc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys + β2Stockc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys
+β3Xc,s,t−1 + ϕc,s + φc,t + θs,t + εc,s,t
(4)
where relative to Model (2), the only change is that the dependent variable denotes the total
emissions of carbon dioxide by industry s in country c during year t, divided by the total value added
of industry s in country c during year t. The evolution of this variable over time thus measures the
industry’s degree of efficiency improvement—that is, how dirty the production process is for a unit
of produced output.
Lastly, we also ask whether any within-industry efficiency gains come through an enhanced
propensity of technologically dirty industries to engage in patented innovation and/or in higher
rates of creative destruction. To that end, we evaluate the following models:
Patentsc,s,t
Populationc,t
= β1Creditc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys + β2Stockc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys
+β3Xc,s,t−1 + ϕc,s + φc,t + θs,t + εc,s,t
(5)
and
Establishmentsc,s,t
Populationc,t
= β1Creditc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys + β2Stockc,t−1 × Pollution intensitys
+β3Xc,s,t−1 + ϕc,s + φc,t + θs,t + εc,s,t
(6)
Here the dependent variable is either the total number of patents or a measure of “green”
patents, in industry s in country c during year t, divided by the population in country c in year t
(Model (5)) and the number of total establishments in industry s in country c in year t, divided
by the population in country c in year t (Model (6)). The evolution of the first variable over time
measures the industry’s propensity to innovate away from dirty technologies. The evolution of the
second one measures the rate at which the industry creates new businesses.
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4 Data
This section introduces the four main data sources used in the empirical analysis. We first describe
the data on carbon dioxide emissions, then the industry-level data on output and green patents,
and finally the country-level data on financial development. We also discuss the matching of the
industry-level data.
4.1 CO2 emissions
We obtain data on CO2 emissions from fuel combustion at the sectoral level from the International
Energy Agency (IEA).11 The data set contains information for 137 countries over the period 1974–
2013. Information on CO2 emissions is reported both at the aggregate level and for a total of 18
industrial sectors, which are based on NACE Rev. 1.1. These sectors encompass each country’s
entire economy, and not just the manufacturing sector, which is important given that some of
the main CO2-polluting activities, such as energy supply and land transportation, are of a non-
manufacturing nature. The 18 sectors are: (1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; (2)
Mining and quarrying; (3) Food products, beverages, and tobacco; (4) Textiles, textile products,
leather, and footwear; (5) Wood and products of wood and cork; (6) Pulp, paper, paper products,
printing, and publishing; (7) Chemical, rubber, plastics, and fuel products; (8) Other non-metallic
mineral products; (9) Basic metals and fabricated metal products; (10) Machinery and equipment;
(11) Transport equipment; (12) Electricity, gas, and water supply; (13) Construction; (14) Land
transport – transport via pipelines; (15) Water transport; (16) Air transport; (17) Real estate,
renting, and business activities; and (18) Community, social, and personal services.
We next produce a data set consisting of countries that each have a fair representation of
industries with non-missing CO2 data. We drop countries that have fewer than 10 sectors with at
least 10 years of CO2 emissions data. This excludes 84 countries so that the final data set consists of
53 countries with at least 10 sectors with at least 10 years of CO2 emissions data. We combine the
country-level and the industry-level data on CO2 emissions with data on each country’s population,
which allows us to construct the dependent variables in Models (1), (2), and (5).
11Eighty percent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are due to the combustion of fossil fuels (Pepper et al., 1992).
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4.2 Industry value added
To calculate the dependent variables in Models (3) and (4), we need industry-level data on value
added. We obtain those from two sources. The first one is the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO) data set, which contains data on value added in manufacturing (21
industries) for all countries in the IEA data set. The second one is the OECD’s STAN Database
for Structural Analysis which provides data on value added for all sectors (62) in the economy, but
it only covers 33 OECD countries. We can therefore calculate proxies for CO2 emissions per unit
of value added, for value added growth, and for each sector’s share of total output in the country,
for two separate data sets. Both cover the period 1974–2013 and one contains 53 countries and
16 sectors while the other comprises 33 countries and 62 sectors. The main tests in the paper are
based on the former data set with a view to maximizing country coverage, but we also include tests
based on the latter data set, in order to maximize sectoral coverage. We winsorize the data on
value added growth at a maximum of 100 percent growth and decline. In order to make overall
value added by the same industry comparable across countries, we first convert all nominal output
into USD and then deflate it to create a time series of real industrial output.
4.3 Green patents
We use the Patent Statistical database (PATSTAT) of the European Patent Office (EPO) to cal-
culate the number of green patents across countries, sectors, and years. PATSTAT is the largest
international patent database. Because of an average delay in data delivery and processing in
PATSTAT of 3.5 years, our patent data end in 2013. To create our patent variables, we follow the
methodological guidelines of the OECD Patent Statistics Manual. First, we take the year of the
application as the reference year unless a priority patent was submitted in another country. In the
latter case, the reference year is the year of the original priority filing. This ensures that we closely
track the actual timing of inventive performance. Second, we take the country of residence of the
inventors as the reference country. If a patent has multiple inventors from different countries, we
use fractional counts (i.e., every country is attributed a corresponding share of the patent). Third,
every patent indicator is based on data from a single patent office and we use the United States as
11
the primary patent office.12
PATSTAT classifies each patent according to the International Patent Classification (IPC). We
round this very detailed classification to 4-character IPC codes and use the concordance table of
Lybbert and Zolas (2014) to convert IPC 4-character sectors into ISIC 2-digit sectors.13 We then
calculate the sum of all green patents in a particular country, sector, and year. The resulting
variable, Green patents, measures all granted patents that belong to the EPO Y02/Y04S climate
change mitigation technology (CCMT) tagging scheme. CCMTs include technologies to reduce the
amount of greenhouse gas emitted into the atmosphere when producing or consuming energy. The
Y02/Y04S scheme provides the most reliable method for identifying green patents and has become
the standard in studies on green innovation. We count all granted patents that belong to the EPO
Y02/Y04S CCMT tagging scheme. This includes Y02P patents, which concern innovations that
make production in a number of energy-intensive sectors more energy efficient. Y02P also includes
green technologies applicable across sectors, such as those relating to the efficient use of energy
and flexible manufacturing systems. The other categories included are green inventions related
to buildings and home appliances (Y02B), alternative (none fossil) energy sources (Y02E), and
smart grids (Y04S). Lastly, we also count patents in Y02T (Climate change mitigation technologies
related to transportation) and Y02W (Climate change mitigation technologies related to solid and
liquid waste treatment).
4.4 Country-level data
Our first measure of financial development, Credit, is the ratio of credit extended to the private
sector to GDP. The numerator is the value of total credit by financial intermediaries to the private
sector (lines 22d and 42d in the IMF International Financial Statistics), and so this measure excludes
credit by central banks (which may reflect political rather than economic considerations). It also
excludes credit to the public sector and cross claims of one group of intermediaries on another.
Lastly, it counts credit from all financial institutions rather than only deposit money banks. The
12In unreported robustness checks, we calculate patent indicators based on EPO data (which are only available
after 1978). The correlation coefficients between US and EPO based indicators range between 0.75 and 0.81.
13PATSTAT also classifies patents according to NACE 2. A drawback of this classification is that it only covers
manufacturing. Given that the scope of our analysis is broader, we do not use this as our baseline approach but only
in robustness checks. To ensure comparability between both approaches, we convert NACE 2 into ISIC 3.1. The
correlation coefficients between both types of indicators vary between 0.93 and 0.98.
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data come from Beck et al. (2016) and are available for all countries in the data set.
The second measure, Stock, is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. In practice,
what goes in the numerator is the value of all traded stocks in the economy, so this is a measure
of the total value of traded stock, not of the intensity with which trading occurs. These data too
come from Beck et al. (2016) and are available for all countries in the data set.
Chart 1 plots the per-year sample average of these two explanatory variables between 1974 and
2013. This shows that stock market development strongly lags credit market development over
time. The growth of credit markets is more gradual, while stock markets are prone to steep booms
and busts. In terms of ratio to GDP, stock markets have only overtaken credit markets for a brief
period during the dot-com bubble of the 1990s and in the run-up to the global financial crisis during
the early to mid-2000s.
In addition to these two variables, we use data on real per capita GDP, on population, on
inflation, and on recessions (calculated as an instance of negative GDP growth) from the World
Development Indicators. Data on systemic banking crises come from Laeven and Valencia (2013).
4.5 Concordance and summary statistics
Our data are available in different industrial classifications. The original IEA data on carbon
dioxide emissions are classified across 18 industrial sectors, using IEA’s classification. The UNIDO
and STAN data on value added are classified in 2-digit industrial classes using the ISIC classification.
This calls for a concordance procedure to match the disaggregated ISIC sectors with the broader
IEA sectors. The matching results in a total of 16 industrial sectors with data on both carbon
dioxide emissions and industrial output. While some sectors are uniquely matched between IEA
and UNIDO/STAN, others result from the merging of ISIC classes. For example, ISIC 15 “Food
products and beverages” and ISIC 16 “Tobacco products” are merged into ISIC 15–16 “Food
products, beverages, and tobacco”, to be matched to the corresponding IEA industry class.
Table 1 summarizes the data. At the country level, we use aggregate CO2 emissions (in tons),
divided by the country’s population. The average country emits 6.87 metric tons of CO2 per
capita. The summary of the financial development proxies shows that while countries typically
have more developed credit than stock markets, stock market development is more dispersed. The
data on GDP per capita make it clear that the data set contains a good mix of developing countries,
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emerging markets, and industrialized economies (see Appendix Table A2 for a list of all sample
countries). The median country in the data set has a population of 16.3 million and annual inflation
of 2.3 percent. On average, a country is in a recession once every five years, and it experiences a
banking crisis once every eight years.
The industry-level data from UNIDO show that the median industry emits 0.08 metric tons of
carbon dioxide per capita per year, and 1 metric ton per million USD of value added. Over the
sample period, the median industry grows by 1 percent per year and makes up about 4.8 percent
of total manufacturing. These values are relatively consistent across the UNIDO and STAN data
sets. However, the median STAN industry records larger per capita emissions than the median
UNIDO industry because the two heaviest polluters—ISIC 40 and 41 “Electricity, gas, and water
supply” and ISIC 60 “Land transport – transport via pipelines”—are not manufacturing industries.
In terms of green patents, the average country-industry produces around 0.1 such patents per 1
million people in the global sample, and 0.16 per 1 million people in the OECD sample.
Table 2 presents the concordance key to match 62 ISIC classes into 16 IEA ones. It also sum-
marizes, by sector, the main industrial benchmark in the paper, “Pollution intensity”, calculated
as the average per capita emissions of carbon dioxide by all firms in the respective sector across
the world and over the whole sample period.
5 Empirical Results
This section consists of six subsections. Section 5.1 investigates the effect of credit and stock
market development on aggregate pollution. In Section 5.2, we then assess the impact of both types
of finance on industry-level pollution, distinguishing between technologically “dirty” and “clean”
industries. Section 5.3 investigates the degree to which between-industry reallocation and within-
industry efficiency improvements explain the statistical association between finance and emissions.
Section 5.4 provides robustness tests while Section 5.5 analyzes the impact of finance on patented
technological innovation as well as business creation at the industry level. Lastly, in Section 5.6
we test whether the cleansing effect of stock market development in advanced countries reflects the
outsourcing of pollution to emerging markets.
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5.1 Financial development and pollution: Aggregate results
Table 3 reports our baseline results for the impact of financial markets development on carbon
dioxide emissions, using aggregate data. We estimate different versions of Model (1) in the full
panel of 73 countries for the period 1974-2013. This results in a maximum of 2,847 data points
(given the lagged structure of the analysis). However, because financial data, pollution data, and
country controls are not available for each country-year, the number of observations is reduced to
1,571 in the regression without country-specific controls, and down to 1,451 in the regressions with
country controls. Country and year dummies purge our estimates from the impact of unobservable
country-specific time-invariant influences and from the effect of unobservable global trends.
In column (1), we regress country-level per capita pollution on the size of credit markets, proxied
by the ratio of credit extended to the private sector to GDP (Credit). The results strongly suggest
that growing credit markets are associated with higher levels of CO2 pollution. Numerically, the
point estimate implies that going from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the sample, credit market
development increases aggregate CO2 emissions by 0.5 tons per capita, or by one-tenth of a sample
standard deviation. The effect is significant at the 1 percent statistical level.
In column (2), we regress country-level per capita pollution on the size of stock markets, proxied
by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (Stock). We record the opposite effect to the one
in column (1): larger stock markets are associated with substantially lower levels of CO2 pollution.
Numerically, the point estimate implies that going from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the
sample, stock market development reduces aggregate CO2 emissions by 0.3 tons per capita, or by
one-sixteenth of a sample standard deviation. This effect is significant at the 5 percent level.
In column (3), we include both measures of financial development. We confirm that credit
markets and stock markets have a simultaneous and statistically significant, but opposite, effect
on carbon dioxide emissions. Deeper credit markets increase, while deeper stock markets reduce,
overall pollution from CO2. The regression with the two financial variables and with country and
year dummies explains 0.95 of the variation in per capita carbon dioxide emissions.
Next, we include controls for other time-varying country-specific characteristics. First, we
account for the fact that financial development is correlated with general economic development,
and so the former may simply pick up the effect of a general increase in wealth on the demand
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for pollution. However, when we add GDP per capita to the regression (column (4)), we find that
this is not the case: while the economies of richer countries generate more per capita pollution,
the positive effect of credit markets and the negative impact of stock markets still obtain, with
undiminished economic and statistical strength.
The same is true in column (5) where we add the square term of GDP per capita. We confirm the
standard environmental Kuznets curve whereby per capita CO2 emissions first increase and then
decrease with economic development. More specifically, this specification indicates that carbon
emissions start to decline at an annual income of around USD 40k which is the 85th percentile
in our country-level income distribution. This is in line with earlier estimates by Holtz-Eakin and
Selden (1995) who find a peak in CO2 emissions at a per capita GDP of around USD 35k.
In this regression, we also include a number of other controls, which turn out to have the
expected sign. In particular, both recessions and banking crises are associated with lower per
capita CO2 emissions. There are two potential explanations for this effect. For one, overall output
goes down during a recession or a crisis, reducing overall pollution too. Second, the economy may be
using the downturn to purge itself from obsolete (that is, relatively dirty) technologies (Schumpeter,
1912; Caballero and Hammour, 1994). Crucially, the positive effect of credit markets and the
negative effect of stock markets are still recorded in this most saturated specification. Numerically,
the point estimates imply that going from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the sample, credit
market development increases aggregate CO2 emissions by 0.28 of a sample standard deviation,
and that going from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the sample, stock market development
reduces aggregate CO2 emissions by 0.12 of a sample standard deviation.
Our empirical tests demonstrate that financial development is to a large extent responsible for
the inverse-U shape of the environmental Kuznets curve. Because stock markets only catch up with
credit markets at later stages of development (see Chart 1), our results imply that the pattern of
per-capita pollution over time is intimately related to the sequential development of different types
of financial markets. We thus conclude that the evolution of financial structure helps explain the
non-linear relationship between economic development and environmental quality that has been
documented in the literature (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1995).
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5.2 Financial development and pollution: Industry-level results
We next turn to evaluating evidence based on an analysis of the sector-level data. The evidence
derived from aggregate data reported in the previous sub-section may be problematic for several
reasons. Conceptually, incomplete risk-sharing may prevent the aggregate economy from behaving
like a representative agent (Attanasio and Davis, 1996). Econometrically, both financial develop-
ment and industrial pollution could be driven by any of a long list of common omitted variables that
financial sector development could merely be a proxy of. Economies with better growth opportuni-
ties in polluting sectors may be developing their financial markets earlier as well. These issues are
only imperfectly addressed by the matrix of country and year dummies and by the country-specific
controls in the previous subsection.
To address these issues, we adapt the cross-country cross-industry methodology first suggested
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to evaluate the sectoral channels through which financial markets
affect industrial pollution. We start by constructing a proxy for the industry’s natural propensity
to pollute that is exogenous to pollution in each particular industry-country. The main proxy we
use is the industry-specific average CO2 emissions per unit of output, calculated across all countries
and years in the sample. The assumption is that a global average reflects the technological frontier
of an industry rather than its performance in an individual country. In robustness tests, we follow
Rajan and Zingales (1998) more closely and calculate each industry’s average CO2 emissions per
unit of output in the United States. The assumption in this case is that an industry’s pollution
intensity in a country with few regulatory impediments and with deep and liquid financial markets
reflects the industry’s inherent propensity to pollute and is unaffected by regulatory arrangements
or by credit constraints.
In Table 4, we evaluate Model (2) to test whether technologically dirty sectors produce higher
carbon dioxide emissions than technologically clean sectors in countries with growing financial
markets. The estimates in column (1) strongly suggest that industries that pollute relatively more
for inherent, technological reasons, generate relatively higher carbon dioxide emissions in countries
with expanding credit markets. This effect is significant at the 1-percent statistical level and is
economically meaningful, too. In column (2), we find that stock markets have the exact opposite
effect: industries that pollute relatively more for technology-related reasons, produce relatively
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lower carbon dioxide emissions in countries with deepening stock markets. Once again, the effect is
significant at the 1 percent statistical level. We also note that sectors that constitute a larger share
of the overall economy—in terms of value added—pollute more per capita than relatively smaller
sectors.
The opposite effects of the two types of financial markets still obtain when we include them
together (column (3)). In this case, the numerical impact of credit markets is almost twice as high
as that of stock markets. This suggests that pollution in a country will increase materially if private
credit and stock market capitalization simultaneously increase by the same factor. In this way, the
estimates in column (3) of Table 4 mirror conceptually those in column (3) of Table 3.
Crucially, all regressions in Table 4 (and thereafter) are saturated with interactions of country-
sector dummies, country-year dummies, and sector-year dummies. The inclusion of these makes
sure that the effect we measure in the data is not contaminated by unobservable factors that are
specific to a sector in a country and that do not change over time, by unobservable time-varying
factors that are common to all industries within a country, and to unobservable, time-varying
factors that are specific to an industry and common to all countries.
5.3 Financial development and pollution: Channels
Our main finding so far is that per capita carbon dioxide emissions increase with credit market
development and decline with stock market development, more so in industries that are technolog-
ically dirty. This naturally raises the question via which channels credit translates into higher, and
equity into lower, industrial pollution. There are two such potential channels. The first one is cross-
industry reallocation whereby—holding technology constant—stock markets reallocate investment
towards, and credit markets reallocate investment away from, relatively clean industrial sectors.
The second channel is within-industry technological innovation whereby—holding the industrial
structure constant—industries over time adopt more efficient (in our case, cleaner) technologies. If
this channel is at play, our results would imply that access to equity finance facilitates the process
of within-industry technological innovation, while access to credit slows it down by perpetuating
firms’ use of inefficient (dirty) technologies and/or by facilitating the adoption of such technologies.
In what follows, we test for whether any of the two, or both, channels are indeed operational.
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5.3.1 Cross-industry reallocation
In Table 5, we test the first channel by running Model (3) on our data. By doing so, we replicate
Table 4, but this time the dependent variable is the growth in value added in a particular indus-
try in a particular country during a particular year. As before, all regressions are saturated with
interactions of country-sector dummies, country-year dummies, and sector-year dummies. In this
case, a negative coefficient on the interaction term of interest would imply that financial develop-
ment results in a reallocation of investment away from technologically dirty industries. This test is
conceptually similar to Wurgler (2000) who finds that in countries with deeper financial markets,
investment is higher in booming than in declining sectors.
In all specifications, we find that larger sectors grow more slowly, a result in line with theories
of growth convergence. In a country-industry setting, this effect also mirrors the canonical work
in this line of research by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Turning to the main variables of interest, in
column (1), we find that technologically dirty sectors grow faster in countries with growing credit
markets. However, the effect is not significant at any traditional level of statistical significance. In
column (2), we find that dirty industries grow more slowly (or, conversely, that clean industries
grow faster) in countries with expanding stock markets. This effect is significant at the 10-percent
statistical level. Once we estimate the effect of the two types of financial development jointly
(column (3)), we find that both continue to exert the already documented effects (positive in the
case of credit markets, and negative in the case of stock markets). In this case, both effects are
significant at the 10-percent statistical level.
We conclude that there is evidence to confirm the conjecture that—holding cross-industry differ-
ences in technology constant—credit markets promote a reallocation of investment towards dirtier
sectors. This can partially explain the positive impact of growing credit markets on per capita
pollution that we find in Table 4. At the same time, the opposite holds for stock markets and
this helps explain the decline in per-capita CO2 emissions by technologically dirty industries in
countries with deepening stock markets.
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5.3.2 Within-industry efficiency improvement
In Table 6, we test the second channel by estimating Model (4) on our data. In this model, the
dependent variable is CO2 emissions per unit of value added, rather than CO2 emissions per capita.
Once again, all regressions are saturated with interactions of country-sector dummies, country-year
dummies, and sector-year dummies. In this case, a negative coefficient on the interaction term of
interest would imply that financial development results in a technological improvement within an
environmentally dirty industry, regardless of its level of overall growth.
In column (1), we find evidence of declining levels of within-industry technological innovation
as credit markets develop. In particular, in countries with growing credit markets, and relative
to clean sectors, dirty sectors exhibit higher levels of CO2 per unit of value added. The effect is
significant at the 5-percent statistical level. We next look at the independent effect of stock markets
on pollution per unit of output. The evidence in column (2) suggests that stock markets have the
opposite effect: pollution levels per unit of value added decline in dirty sectors, relative to clean
ones, in countries with deepening stock markets. This effect is significant at the 1-percent statistical
level, and it is numerically stronger than the effect of credit markets. Once we juxtapose the two
types of financial development, we find that both effects still obtain, and both are statistically
significant (column (3)). The magnitude of the point estimates implies that the impact of stock
markets on pollution per unit of output is considerably more powerful than that of credit markets.
In particular, CO2 emissions per unit of value added would decrease if a country was to double the
overall size of its financial system, while holding constant the ratio of credit to stock markets.
The evidence in Table 6 suggests that stock markets facilitate the adoption of cleaner tech-
nologies in polluting industries. There is weaker evidence for the opposite effect in countries with
developing credit markets. This evidence thus helps explain the negative impact of stock markets,
and the positive effect of credit markets, on per capita pollution documented in Table 4.14
14We find a consistent picture when we instead include the overall size of a country’s financial system (that is,
stock and credit markets combined) and financial structure (that is, the ratio between the size of the stock and credit
market) as explanatory variables. While a growing financial system benefits relatively dirty industries, this effect
becomes smaller when stock markets develop faster than credit markets (Appendix Table A3).
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5.4 Financial development and pollution: Robustness
5.4.1 Controlling for other country- and industry-specific factors
We next test the robustness of our results to the impact of a host of country factors that could impact
industry-specific emission levels and that are correlated with financial development. First, we take
all country-specific variables included in column (5) of Table 3, interact them with each sector’s
benchmark technological pollution intensity, and include them alongside the main covariates. We
do so in all regressions, in order to saturate the model with a number of potential channels which
may operate alongside financial structure, such as economic development, market size, and the
business cycle.
We also include interactions of Credit and Stock with three additional industry-specific bench-
marks. The first one is External dependence, proxied as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) by the
difference between investment and cash flow. Data come from Duygan-Bump et al. (2015). This
variable controls for the possibility that the financial structure operates through the industry’s
natural reliance on external financing, and not through its propensity to pollute. The second
benchmark is Growth opportunities, measured as the industry’s global average sales growth in a
particular year. The interaction of this benchmark with the country’s financial structure controls
for the possibility that changes in credit and equity financing result in changes in pollution through
the channel of global growth opportunities. The third benchmark is Asset tangibility, measured
as the ratio of an industry’s tangible assets to total assets. Data come from Braun (2003). The
interaction of this benchmark with the size of credit and stock markets accounts for the possibility
that, for instance, the impact of financial structure on pollution by dirty industries reflects that
such industries are also more reliant on tangible assets which credit markets are more likely to
fund. We add the three industry benchmarks to the regression, one by one, in order to evaluate
their independent impact on pollution intensity.
Similar to Table 3, Table 7 indicates that a number of country-specific factors are significantly
correlated with pollution. For example, CO2 emissions are lower in richer countries, both per-capita
(columns (1)–(3)) and per-unit of output (columns (7)–(9)). Per capita pollution also declines with
market size (columns (1)–(3)). The business cycle exerts a similar effect on pollution levels as
recorded in Table 3: per capita pollution is higher during the expansion phase of the cycle (proxied
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by higher inflation), and it is lower during the contraction phase (proxied by whether the country
is in a recession or experiencing a banking crisis).
The impact of the alternative industry benchmarks is nuanced. We find that industries depen-
dent on external finance pollute more per capita as credit markets develop, but less in countries
with deepening stock markets (column (1)). Industries facing better global growth opportunities
pollute more, both per capita (column (2)) and per unit of output (column (8)), in countries with
expanding stock markets. Lastly, there is some evidence that part of the positive impact of credit
markets on pollution in technologically dirty industries operates through these sectors’ differential
reliance on tangible assets (column (3)).
Importantly, the main results recorded in columns (1)–(3) survive in this more saturated spec-
ification. We still find that per capita carbon dioxide emissions increase relatively more in dirty
sectors in countries with growing credit markets, and decrease in countries with deepening stock
markets (columns (1)–(3)). Technologically clean industries grow faster in countries with expand-
ing stock markets but this effect is only significant in one case out of three (column (4)). Lastly,
the efficiency gains from more developed stock markets are not sensitive to adding the full range
of country and industry controls (columns (7)–(9)). The documented effect continues to be eco-
nomically significant, too. For example, the coefficient on the interaction of pollution intensity and
stock market development in column (1) (-0.1445) suggests that moving from the 25th to the 75th
percentile of stock market development is associated with a decline in CO2 emissions per capita
in an industry at the 75th percentile of pollution intensity—relative to an industry at the 25th
percentile of pollution intensity—of 0.030. This equals 7.2% of the sample mean.15
15We also find that the main results in the paper survive once we control for the impact of country-industry-specific
fuel subsidies (Appendix Table A4). Fuel subsidies may blunt firms’ incentives to make their production technology
more energy efficient, even when firms can access stock markets to finance such green investments. Relatedly, Newell,
Jaffe and Stavins (1999) find that oil price increases stimulate innovation to make air conditioners more energy
efficient while Aghion et al. (2016) show how higher fuel prices redirect the car industry towards clean innovation
(electric and hybrid technologies) and away from dirty technology (internal combustion engines). Other papers stress
that policy interventions may be needed to stimulate clean technologies and move countries towards sustainable
growth. Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2012) and Acemoglu, Akcigit, Hanley and Kerr (2016) develop
endogenous growth models with directed technical change in which sustainable growth depends on temporary carbon
taxes and research subsidies that redirect innovation towards clean technologies.
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5.4.2 Robustness to alternative pollution-intensity measures
We next subject our results to a set of robustness tests where we employ alternative industry proxies
for pollution intensity. Our industry benchmark for pollution intensity may be an imperfect proxy
for the industry’s “true” propensity to pollute. Recall that the benchmark we have used so far is
based on average CO2 emissions per unit of output over the sample period, in the global sample.
This benchmark could be distorted if in many countries regulation is stringent and/or polluting
firms are credit constrained, resulting in lower pollution than the industry’s technology would imply.
One alternative is to calculate this variable on the basis of pollution per unit of output in one
particular country that is simultaneously characterized by a relatively lax regulatory environment
and deep financial markets. Consistent with the original idea in Rajan and Zingales (1998), the
United States is a prime example of such a country.16 To bring this idea to the analysis, we first
calculate for each industry an alternative benchmark for pollution intensity using only US data on
average CO2 emissions per unit of output over the sample period. The correlation between the two
benchmarks is 0.92, suggesting that the ranking of industries in terms of inherent propensity to
pollute is not a feature of one particular pollution-intensity measure.
Second, we use the measure of pollution per worker developed by the World Bank’s Industrial
Pollution Projection System (IPPS). IPPS was developed from a database of environmental and
economic data for about 200,000 facilities spanning 1,500 product categories with different operating
technologies and pollutants. We focus on air pollution in the form of sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds, and total particulates. This
measure therefore complements our CO2 baseline measure of air pollution. We use IPPS values
with respect to employment based on the same level of industry aggregation that we use in the rest
of the paper. IPPS is an especially useful tool to estimate pollution load in developing countries
where sufficient data for mass balance calculations from production processes are not available.
With these two new benchmarks in hand, we re-estimate Models (2)—(4), and report the
results in Table 8. The reported results are in remarkable agreement with our previous estimates.
16The OECD publishes two Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) indices, one for the energy sector and one for
the economy as a whole. These indices measure the stringency of regulation to mitigate greenhouse gases, including
emission trading schemes for CO2 and SO2, taxes on CO2, taxes on the industrial use of diesel, and so on. According
to 2012 data, the American EPS index for the energy sector was among the five lowest across the OECD while the
economy-wide EPS index was in the bottom half. Over the period 1990-2012, the US economy-wide index value was
typically below the OECD average and never among the top 10 OECD countries. Source: https://stats.oecd.org/.
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In columns (1) and (2), we find that CO2 emissions per capita are significantly higher (lower) in
technologically dirty industries in countries with more developed credit markets (stock markets).
Both effects are significant at least at the 5-percent statistical level. These results fully confirm the
evidence in Table 4, and suggest that the impact of financial development on industrial pollution is
independent of the benchmark used to classify industries as either dirty or clean. We also document
weak evidence that growing stock markets are associated with slower growth in technologically
dirty industries when we use US data to construct the industry benchmark for pollution intensity
(column (3)). Lastly, we confirm our prior results on the relationship between financial structure and
production efficiency: technologically dirty sectors emit more CO2 per unit of output in countries
with growing credit markets, while the opposite is true of countries with deepening stock markets
(columns (5) and (6)).
5.4.3 Finance and pollution at later stages of development
A remaining question is whether our results are driven by a particular sample choice. Our findings
so far are based on the UNIDO sample which features more countries (53) but fewer sectors (9
manufacturing ones).17 The UNIDO sample contains many developing countries and emerging
markets. Therefore, this particular sample choice may produce empirical regularities that are driven
by the manufacturing industry in countries with relatively low levels of financial development.
We now make a different sample choice. First, we only focus on those country-years where both
the level of credit market development and stock market development is above the 25th percentile.
In that way, we make sure that we capture empirical regularities that are not driven by financial
imperfections at early stages of financial development.
Second, we replicate our tests in the OECD sample, using data from STAN. This alternative
data set allows us to run our tests on a sample of fewer countries (33) but more sectors (16),
encompassing the whole economy with the exception of services. This is potentially important
because the four heaviest polluters according to Table 2—the sectors “Electricity, gas, and water
supply”, “Land transport – transport via pipelines”, “Water transport” and “Air transport”—are
not part of manufacturing. In this way, we make sure that our results are not driven by a special
17Together with primary industry, the manufacturing sector accounts for almost 40 per cent of worldwide greenhouse
gas emissions (Martin, de Preux and Wagner, 2014).
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relationship between finance and pollution in the manufacturing sector.
With this strategy in hand, we replicate the most saturated versions of Models (2), (3), and (4)—
that is, the ones with country-sector dummies, country-year dummies, and sector-year dummies.
We report the results from these tests in Table 9. We find that the stage of overall financial
development does not matter much, as all previous results are confirmed in a sample excluding
countries at very low levels of financial development. We continue to find that credit markets
increase per capita pollution levels, owing to a reduction in within-industry efficiency, and that
stock markets reduce per capita pollution levels, owing to a simultaneous reduction in the size of
dirty industries and an increase in within-industry efficiency (columns (1)–(3)).
When we move to the OECD sample, we find that deeper stock markets are still associated
with a reduction in per-capita pollution levels (column (4)), and that this result is fully driven by
an increase in within-industry efficiency (column (6)). However, we now find that controlling for
stock market development, deeper credit markets are also associated with a reduction in per capita
pollution levels (column (4)). This effect is due to relatively faster growth in technologically clean
industries (column (5)).
The evidence in Table 9 thus suggests that the negative impact of stock markets on industrial
pollution is not a feature of a sample dominated by lower-income countries or by economies at early
stages of financial development. However, the impact of credit markets on industrial pollution
appears to reverse at later stages of development, suggesting that overall financial development
exerts a positive impact on environmental quality once countries reach a certain income level.
5.5 Financial development, innovation, and new business creation
In the previous sections, we found that CO2 emissions per unit of output decline with stock market
development, relatively more in technologically dirty industries. The intuitive interpretation of
this result is that it reflects the propensity of dirty industries to innovate more in countries where
more of their financing comes from equity markets. Such an effect could come from two different
directions: either existing companies upgrade their technology, or older companies in possession
of less efficient technologies are displaced by younger, more technologically innovative companies
(that is, creative destruction in the spirit of Schumpeter, 1912).
We now aim to provide direct evidence for this conjecture. We start by exploring the link
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between financial development and innovation in technologically ”dirty” sectors. To that end,
we incorporate in our analysis data on industrial patenting for our sample countries. We use of
a uniquely comprehensive global dataset on patents, PATSTAT, which reports patents classified
according to the International Patent Classification (IPC). For the countries and industries in
our sample, we calculate four separate variables. The first one, “Total patents”, measures all
patents granted to an industry in a country, regardless of the patent’s underlying technological
contribution. The second one, “Green patents”, measures all granted patents that belong to the
EPO Y02/Y04S climate change mitigation technology (CCMT) tagging scheme. The third one,
“Green patents (excluding transportation and waste)”, counts all granted patents that belong to the
EPO Y02/Y04S CCMT tagging scheme, with the exception of Y02T (Climate change mitigation
technologies related to transportation) and Y02T (Climate change mitigation technologies related
to solid and liquid waste treatment). The resulting group of patents consists of patents related to
energy efficiency (Y02P), buildings and home appliances (Y02B), alternative (none fossil) energy
sources (Y02E), and smart grids (Y04S). The fourth variable, “Green patents (energy intensive
sectors)”, counts patents that belong only to the arguably most important category of patents
when it comes to green innovation, Y02P.
With these data in hand, we now proceed to estimate Model (5). Table 10 reports the resulting
estimates. This table follows the logic of Tables (4)–(6) whereby we first test for the effect of
credit markets and stock markets separately and then jointly. The results indicate that patenting
in technologically dirty industries declines with credit market development. This is the case both
for total patents (column (1)) and for various green patent aggregates (columns (2)–(4)). At the
same time, the number of green patents per capita increases relatively more in technologically dirty
industries in countries with deeper stock markets. This effect is only significant at the 10-percent
statistical level, but is consistent across all three specifications (columns (2)–(4)). These results
complement those of Hsu, Tian and Xu (2014), who show that industries that depend on external
finance and are high-tech intensive are less (more) likely to file patents in countries with better
developed credit (equity) markets. We find that credit and stock markets also have contrasting
effects on the ability of polluting industries to become greener through innovation.
These effects are economically meaningful, too. For example, the coefficient of 0.0529 in column
(2) suggests that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of stock market development is
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associated with an increase in the number of green patents generated by an industry at the 75th
percentile of pollution intensity—relative to one at the 25th percentile of pollution intensity—of
0.0049 patents per million, which is equal to 8% of the sample mean. 18
Next, we turn to the question of new business creation. For each of the 18 industrial sectors,
UNIDO reports, by year, the total number of establishments. We divide by total population and
take the logarithm of the resulting value. We then estimate Model (6) where, in the context of a
fixed-effect regression, the impact on the dependent variable can be understood as a change in the
growth rate of total establishments. Building on the evidence we have shown so far, we also do
this for three different samples: the full sample, the sample of countries at later stages of financial
development, and the sample of OECD countries at later stages of financial development.
The evidence reported in Table 11 unequivocally suggests that a higher degree of credit market
development is associated with a higher rate of new business creation in technologically ”dirty”
industries. The economic magnitude of this effect is meaningful, too. For example, the coefficient on
the interaction of pollution intensity and credit market development in column (1) (0.0707) suggests
that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of credit market development is associated with
an increase in the number of establishments per capita in an industry at the 75th percentile of
pollution intensity—relative to an industry at the 25th percentile of pollution intensity—of 0.015.
This corresponds to one-fifth of a sample standard deviation. Stock markets, at the same time,
have the opposite effect: the number of establishments declines in technologically ”dirty” industries
with deeper stock markets, in particular in countries at later stages of financial development. The
combined evidence in Tables 10 and 11 thus suggests that financial structure affects differentially
the rates of creative destruction in technologically dirty and in technologically clean industries,
pointing to a robust channel linking financial development and industrial pollution.
5.6 Financial development and industrial pollution: The role of outsourcing
One final concern that we need to address is that much of the decline in domestic industrial
pollution as a result of stock market development is driven by the outsourcing of ”dirty” industries
to emerging economies. Because funding through stock markets is ultimately provided by individual
18As many country-industry-year cells are empty, we also estimate this table using logit regressions on the basis of
a sample of non-zero observations. The results in Appendix Table A5 are broadly in line with those reported here.
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investors with their own social objectives, stock markets may be more sensitive to the financing of
firms that perform badly in environmental terms (Salinger, 1992; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).
One unintended consequence of this social objective may be that firms close domestic operations,
but open foreign ones, under the assumption that poor environmental performance away from home
will be more acceptable (or less observable) to their investors. If so, then the decline in pollution
domestically would be neutralized by a proportionate increase in pollution in emerging markets,
making for a null effect from a global point of view.
To test this hypothesis, we modify Models (1)–(3) in the following way. First, we focus on the
10 major emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, Russia,
South Africa, and Turkey. Next, we take US stock market development as a benchmark, and
interact, for all of these 10 emerging markets, the US-specific stock market development with the
industry-specific pollution intensity. In this regression, the inclusion of Industry×Year fixed effects
is not possible because the industry trend is collinear with the interaction of US stock market
development and the industry benchmark for its propensity to pollute.
As a second way to address the same question, we postulate that a country is more likely to be
affected by stock market developments in close and large financial centers. This is consistent with
gravity models in finance and trade which have demonstrated that distance matters for financial
and commercial relationships between two countries (e.g., Frankel, Stein, and Wei, 1995; Frankel
and Romer, 1999; Martin and Rey, 2004). We therefore calculate the distance from each of the 10
emerging markets’ capitals to each of the three main global financial centers (New York, London,
and Tokyo). Then, for each of the 10 emerging markets, we calculate a distance-weighted aggregate
stock market development. This specification results in a measure of core stock market development
that varies across time and emerging market, allowing for the inclusion of Industry×Year fixed
effects.
The estimates from these modified versions of Models (1)–(3) are reported in Table 12. The data
fail to reject the hypothesis that stock market development in the US (Panel A) or in the three
core financial centers (Panel B) has an impact on technologically ”dirty” industries’ propensity
to pollute in emerging markets. In particular, we find no increase in CO2 emissions per capita
(column (1)), in growth rates (column (2)), and in CO2 emissions per unit of output (column (3))
in such industries in emerging markets, relative to technologically ”clean” ones. We conclude that
28
the reduction in pollution in industries with a high natural propensity to pollute, as a result of
domestic stock market development, is not mirrored by a proportionate increase in pollution by
the same industries in emerging economies.
6 Conclusion
The rapid growth of green finance, and the myriad associated policy initiatives, contrasts sharply
with the paucity of the existing evidence on the impact of conventional finance on carbon emissions
and other forms of pollution. To help quantify this role, we study the relationship between financial
development and industrial pollution in a large panel data set of countries and industries over the
period 1974–2013. We find a strong positive impact of credit markets, but a strong negative
impact of stock markets, on aggregate CO2 emissions per capita. When further analyzing the
impact of financial development on industries that pollute relatively more for intrinsic technological
reasons, we find that such industries emit relatively more carbon dioxide in countries with larger
credit markets. At the same time, such dirty industries produce relatively less carbon dioxide in
countries with deepening stock markets. This first set of results can be interpreted in light of the
Kuznets-curve argument that industrial pollution follows an inverse-U shape over the development
cycle. Our empirical setting addresses this issue head on by juxtaposing the effects of bank and
market intermediation. As stock markets tend to develop at later stages of development than credit
markets, our findings show that financial development directly contributes to the concave shape of
industrial pollution over time.
We next study the mechanisms that underpin these country- and industry-level results. We find
strong evidence for the conjecture that stock markets facilitate the adoption of cleaner technolo-
gies in polluting industries. At the same time, credit market development reduces within-industry
pollution efficiency. Further analysis of sectoral patenting data confirms that deeper stock markets
(credit markets) are associated with more (less) green innovation in traditionally polluting indus-
tries, as well as with lower (higher) rates of new business creation in those industries. We also
document weak evidence that—holding cross-industry differences in technology constant—credit
markets tend to reallocate investment towards dirtier sectors, while the opposite is true for stock
markets. These empirical regularities are broadly robust to controlling for a host of potential
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confounding factors, such as general economic development, market size, and the business cycle,
country-industry fixed effects, and unobservable country and industry trends.
In sum, our findings indicate that not only financial development, but also financial structure
has an important effect on environmental quality. This suggests that countries with a bank-based
financial system that aim to green their economy, such as through the promotion of green bonds or
other green-finance initiatives, should consider stimulating the development of conventional equity
markets as well. This holds especially for middle-income countries where carbon dioxide emissions
may have increased more or less linearly during the development process. There, according to our
findings, stock markets could play an important role in making future growth greener, in particular
by stimulating innovation that leads to cleaner production processes within industries.
In parallel, countries can take measures to counterbalance the tendency of credit markets to
(continue to) finance relatively dirty industries. Examples include the green credit guidelines and
resolutions that China and Brazil introduced in 2012 and 2014, respectively, to encourage banks
to improve their environmental and social performance and to lend more to firms that are part
of the low-carbon economy. From an industry perspective, adherence to the so-called Carbon
Principles, Climate Principles, and Equator Principles should also contribute to a gradual greening
of bank lending.19 Strict adherence to these principles can also make governmental climate change
policies more effective by accelerating capital reallocation and investment towards lower-carbon
technologies.
19The Carbon Principles are guidelines to assess the climate change risks of financing electric power projects. The
Climate Principles comprise a similar but broader framework. Lastly, the Equator Principles are a risk management
framework to assess and manage environmental and social risk in large projects. Equator Principle banks commit not
to lend to borrowers that do not comply with their environmental and social policies and procedures, and to require
borrowers with greenhouse gas emissions above a certain threshold to implement measures to reduce such emissions.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Country-level
CO2 per capita 6.872 6.289 5.288 0.105 45.036
Credit/GDP 0.608 0.505 0.433 0.009 2.129
Stock/GDP 0.481 0.339 0.454 0.001 2.651
GDP per capita 20,731 13,221 19,665 366 110,001
Population (mln.) 73.793 16.282 197.712 0.355 1,357.380
Inflation 0.028 0.023 0.027 -0.047 0.382
Recession 0.209 0.000 0.407 0.000 1.000
Banking crisis 0.128 0.000 0.334 0.000 1.000
Industry-level (UNIDO)
CO2 emissions per capita 0.439 0.078 1.187 0.000 29.264
CO2 emissions per value added 0.002 0.001 0.006 -0.052 0.257
Growth in value added 0.010 0.012 0.175 -1.000 1.000
Total patents per capita 1.980 0.000 11.953 0.000 275.901
Green patents per capita 0.099 0.000 0.618 0.000 21.131
Green patents per capita 0.078 0.000 0.528 0.000 20.850
(excl. transport and waste)
Green patents per capita 0.034 0.000 0.203 0.000 10.487
(energy intensive sectors)
Establishments per 1000 capita 0.234 0.080 0.436 0.000 6.525
Industry share 0.061 0.048 0.056 0.000 0.783
Fuel subsidies 9.647 1.082 42.186 -129.594 413.833
Industry-level (OECD)
CO2 emissions per capita 0.562 0.119 1.379 0.000 29.264
CO2 emissions per value added 0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.023 0.217
Growth in value added 0.008 0.011 0.126 -1.000 1.000
Total patents per capita 3.290 0.000 15.330 0.000 275.901
Green patents per capita 0.162 0.000 0.788 0.000 21.131
Green patents per capita 0.129 0.000 0.678 0.000 20.850
(excl. transport and waste)
Green patents per capita 0.057 0.000 0.260 0.000 10.487
(energy intensive sectors)
Establishments per 1000 capita 0.305 0.127 0.512 0.000 6.525
Industry share 0.074 0.036 0.105 0.001 0.897
Fuel subsidies 0.381 0.235 15.512 -129.594 74.508
Notes: This table summarizes the data used in the paper. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 2: Industry benchmarks
ISIC code Industry name Pollution
intensity
External
dependence
01-05 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 0.218 -1.430
10-14 Mining and quarrying 0.129 0.193
15-16 Food products, beverages, and tobacco 0.202 -0.309
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather, and footwear 0.128 -0.028
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.115 -0.023
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing 0.229 -0.016
23-25 Chemical, rubber, plastics, and fuel products 0.525 0.106
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 1.134 -0.960
27 Basic metals 1.712 -0.067
28-33 Fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment 0.040 -0.058
34-35 Transport equipment 0.068 -0.108
40-41 Electricity, gas, and water supply 8.083 0.240
45 Construction 0.037 0.570
60 Land transport transport via pipelines 3.000 1.000
61 Water transport 7.320 0.670
62 Air transport 3.845 0.480
Notes: This table summarizes, by industry, the main benchmarks used in the paper. Appendix Table
A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 3: Financial development and aggregate pollution
Dependent variable CO2 emissions per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit/GDP 0.0004*** 0.0005** 0.0006*** 0.0013***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Stocks/GDP -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0002** -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Log GDP per capita 0.0025*** 0.0137***
(0.0004) (0.0027)
Log GDP per capita squared -0.0006***
(0.0002)
Log Population -0.0014
(0.0010)
Inflation 0.0008
(0.0009)
Recession -0.0002**
(0.0001)
Banking crisis -0.0006***
(0.0001)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 2,184 1,608 1,571 1,571 1,451
R-squared 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.960 0.960
Notes: This table reports estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is ‘CO2 emissions per capita’ which denotes
aggregate emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Robust standard errors are
included in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical level, respectively.
Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 4: Financial development and industry-level pollution per capita
Dependent variable CO2 emissions per capita
(1) (2) (3)
Credit/GDP × Pollution intensity 0.1286*** 0.2065***
(0.0390) (0.0487)
Stocks/GDP × Pollution intensity -0.1411*** -0.1167**
(0.0484) (0.0457)
Industry share 0.0082*** 0.0159*** 0.0146***
(0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0048)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 9,806 8,309 8,124
R-squared 0.764 0.761 0.773
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is ‘CO2 emissions per
capita’ which denotes industry-specific emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons, per capita. Industry-specific
data come from UNIDO. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at
the country-year level are included in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent statistical level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 5: Cross-industry reallocation
Dependent variable Growth in value added
(1) (2) (3)
Credit/GDP × Pollution intensity 0.1917 0.2402*
(0.1654) (0.1694)
Stocks/GDP × Pollution intensity -0.2448* -0.2346*
(0.1445) (0.1477)
Industry share -0.0705*** -0.0951*** -0.0975***
(0.0087) (0.0144) (0.0147)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 10,216 8,371 8,188
R-squared 0.510 0.547 0.548
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is ‘Growth in value
added’ which denotes industry-specific growth in value added. Industry-specific data come from UNIDO.
All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the country-year level are
included in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical
level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 6: Industry-level pollution per unit of output
Dependent variable CO2 emissions per value added
(1) (2) (3)
Credit/GDP × Pollution intensity 0.8583** 0.5180*
(0.3443) (0.2979)
Stocks/GDP × Pollution intensity -1.1267*** -1.1415***
(0.2379) (0.2415)
Industry share -0.0069 0.0041 0.0006
(0.0052) (0.0069) (0.0072)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 9,338 7,875 7,702
R-squared 0.836 0.843 0.844
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is ‘CO2 emissions per
value added’ which denotes industry-specific emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons, per unit of value added.
Industry-specific data come from UNIDO. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard
errors clustered at the country-year level are included in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all
variable definitions.
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Table 10: Financial development and green innovation
Dependent variable Total patents
per capita
Green patents
per capita
Green patents
per capita
(excl.
transport and
waste)
Green patents
per capita
(energy
intensive
sectors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit/GDP × Pollution intensity -0.0011** -0.3339*** -0.3814*** -0.0955***
(0.0005) (0.1162) (0.1159) (0.0289)
Stocks/GDP × Pollution intensity -0.0003 0.0529* 0.0499* 0.0381*
(0.0006) (0.0382) (0.0329) (0.0268)
Industry share 0.0002*** 0.0083* 0.0103** 0.0024
(0.0001) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0024)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 8,640 8,640 8,640 8,640
R-squared 0.907 0.762 0.720 0.688
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. In column (1), the dependent variable is ‘Total patents per captia’
which denotes the number of total patents in a country-industry-year, per 1 mln. population; in column (2), the dependent
variable is ‘Green patents per capita’ which denotes the number of green patents in a country-industry-year, per 1 mln.
population; in column (3), the dependent variable is ‘Green patents per capita (excl. transport and waste)’ which denotes
the number of patents in the most climate-change-intensive technologies in a country-industry-year, per 1 mln. population,
excluding patents related to transportation and to wastewater treatment and waste management; and in column (4), the
dependent variable is ‘Green patents per capita (energy intensive sectors)’ which denotes the number of patents in energy-
intensive sectors in a country-industry-year, per 1 mln. population. Industry-specific data come from UNIDO. All regressions
include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the country-year level are included in parentheses, where ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable
definitions.
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Table 11: Financial development and new business creation
Dependent variable Establishments per 1000 capita
Full sample Later stages of
development
Later stages of
development and
OECD
(1) (2) (3)
Credit/GDP × Pollution intensity 0.0707*** 0.0530*** 0.0592**
(0.0161) (0.0178) (0.0241)
Stocks/GDP × Pollution intensity -0.0091 -0.0652*** -0.0536***
(0.0184) (0.0151) (0.0195)
Industry share 0.0115*** 0.0088*** 0.0048***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0012)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 7,025 4,942 3,726
R-squared 0.939 0.961 0.961
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is ‘Establishments per 1000
capita’ which denotes the total number of establishments per 1000 capita. Industry-specific data come from
UNIDO and STAN. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the country-
year level are included in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
statistical level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table 12: Financial development and pollution: Outsourcing
Panel A. US financial development
Dependent variable CO2 emissions
per capita
Growth in value
added
CO2 emissions
per value added
(1) (2) (3)
Credit/GDP (US) × Pollution intensity -0.0079 -0.548 -3.5078***
(0.0199) (0.5188) (0.8327)
Stocks/GDP (US) × Pollution intensity -0.0142 0.3425 -0.1405
(0.0175) (0.4524) (0.7463)
Industry share 0.0017*** -0.1198*** -0.0764**
(0.0006) (0.0254) (0.0308)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,709 1,863 1,626
R-squared 0.881 0.505 0.861
Panel B. Distance-weighted average of US, UK, and Japanese financial development
Dependent variable CO2 emissions
per capita
Growth in value
added
CO2 emissions
per value added
(1) (2) (3)
Credit/GDP (US, UK, JP) × Pollution intensity -0.0158 -1.3369 -10.822**
(0.0207) (2.0855) (4.657)
Stocks/GDP (US, UK, JP) × Pollution intensity -0.0094 -1.7816 0.2649
(0.0216) (1.6000) (2.459)
Industry share 0.0017*** -0.1139*** -0.0916***
(0.0006) (0.0258) (0.0329)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,709 1,857 1,613
R-squared 0.881 0.621 0.921
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. In column (1), the dependent variable is ‘CO2 emissions per capita’
which denotes the industry’s emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons, per capita; in column (2), the dependent variable is ‘Growth
in value added’ which denotes the industry’s annual growth in value added; and in column (3), the dependent variables is ‘CO2
emissions per value added’ which denotes the industry’s emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons, per unit of value added. The
sample is restricted to the 10 major emerging markets (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, Russia,
South Africa, and Turkey). ‘Credit/GDP (US)’ denotes the 1-period lagged ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP in
the US. Stock/GDP (US)’ denotes the 1-period lagged ratio of the value of all listed stocks to GDP in the US. ‘Credit/GDP
(US, UK, JP)’ denotes the 1-period lagged ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP in the US, UK, and Japan, weighted by
air distance to the respective country. ‘Stock/GDP (US, UK, JP)’ denotes the 1-period lagged ratio of the value of all listed
stocks to GDP in the US, UK, and Japan, weighted by air distance to the respective country. Industry-specific data come from
UNIDO. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the country-year level are included in
parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical level, respectively. Appendix Table
A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Appendix
Table A1: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Data source
CO2 emissions per
capita
Country or industry-level emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons,
divided by the countrys population
IEA; WDI
CO2 emissions per
value added
Country or industry-level emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons,
divided by value added
IEA; UNIDO;
STAN
Growth in value added Industry-specific growth in value added UNIDO; STAN
Industry share
One-period lagged value added of the industry as a share of the
whole economy
UNIDO
Pollution intensity
Average value, over the sample period, of an industry’s CO2
emissions per value added, for all countries in the sample
IEA; UNIDO;
STAN
Pollution intensity
(US)
Average value, over the sample period, of an industry’s CO2
emissions per value added in the United States
IEA; UNIDO;
STAN
Pollution intensity
(WB)
Per-output emissions of SO2, NO2, CO, volatile organic
compounds, and particulates in an industry
IPPS
External dependence
An industry’s capital expenditures minus cash flow from
operations divided by capital expenditures (in the US)
Duygan-Bump et
al. (2015)
Growth opportunity Sales growth of an industry in the US (sample average) STAN
Asset tangibility Average ratio of tangible assets to total assets in an industry Braun (2003)
Credit/GDP One-period lagged ratio of private-sector credit to GDP Beck et al. (2016)
Stock/GDP One-period lagged ratio of value of all listed stocks to GDP Beck et al. (2016)
Log GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita of a country (log) WDI
Log Population (mln.) Countrys population, in millions of inhabitants (log) WDI
Inflation One-period lagged annual change in consumer price inflation WDI
Continued on next page.
48
Table A1 cont.: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Data source
Recession
Dummy=1 if the country is experiencing negative GDP growth
in a given year; 0 otherwise (one-period lagged)
WDI
Banking crisis
Dummy=1 if the country is experiencing a systemic banking
crisis in a given year; 0 otherwise (one-period lagged)
Laeven and
Valencia (2013)
Total patents per
capita
No. of patents in a country-industry-year, per 1 million
population
PATSTAT
Green patents per
capita
No. of green patents in a country-industry-year, per 1 million
population
PATSTAT
Green patents per
capita (excl. transport
and waste)
No. of patents in the most climate-change-intensive technologies
in a country-industry-year, per 1 million population, excluding
patents related to transportation and to wastewater treatment
and waste management
PATSTAT
Green patents per
capita (energy
intensive sectors)
No. of patents in energy-intensive sectors in a
country-industry-year, per 1 million population.
PATSTAT
Establishments per
1000 capita
No. of establishments in a country-industry-year, per 1,000
population.
UNIDO
Fuel subsidies Post-tax fossil fuel subsidy per $1000 of output (2011)
IMF Energy
Subsidies
Template
Notes: This table provides definitions and data sources for all variables used in the paper. WDI: World Development
Indicators. IPPS: Industrial Pollution Projection System (World Bank). IEA: International Energy Agency. STAN: STAN
Dataset for Structural Analysis (OECD).
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Table A2: List of countries and average financial development
Country Credit /
GDP
Stock /
GDP
CO2 per
capita
Albania 0.161 1.513
Argentina 0.149 0.094 3.541
Australia 0.660 0.731 15.682
Austria 0.817 0.156 7.535
Azerbaijan 0.085 0.001 3.811
Belarus 0.152 6.240
Belgium 0.468 0.403 10.769
Brazil 0.352 0.334 1.468
Bulgaria 0.429 0.092 6.141
Canada 0.969 0.976 15.848
Chile 0.558 0.904 2.681
Colombia 0.290 0.254 1.309
Costa Rica 0.245 0.075 1.092
Croatia 0.468 0.294 3.946
Czech Republic 0.479 0.180 11.643
Denmark 0.792 0.356 10.396
Estonia 0.495 0.231 12.256
FYR of Macedonia 0.296 0.067 4.345
Finland 0.630 0.656 10.693
France 0.768 0.403 6.296
Germany 0.917 0.282 11.188
Greece 0.487 0.369 6.556
Hungary 0.368 0.186 6.104
India 0.276 0.445 0.734
Indonesia 0.279 0.246 0.944
Ireland 0.737 0.518 8.835
Italy 0.629 0.306 6.689
Japan 1.610 0.646 8.402
Kazakhstan 0.238 0.152 11.404
Lithuania 0.278 0.152 4.159
Luxembourg 0.922 1.027 25.911
Mexico 0.192 0.198 3.349
Morocco 0.329 0.354 0.954
Netherlands 0.845 0.614 9.950
New Zealand 0.684 0.386 6.638
Norway 0.679 0.349 7.018
China 0.936 0.329 3.247
Philippines 0.324 0.482 0.739
Poland 0.346 0.193 9.292
Portugal 0.856 0.302 3.926
Russian Federation 0.229 0.363 10.908
Slovak Republic 0.417 0.567 8.160
Slovenia 0.454 0.190 7.307
South Africa 0.991 1.420 7.249
Spain 0.951 0.666 5.622
Sweden 0.949 0.607 6.072
Switzerland 1.336 1.392 5.889
Thailand 0.855 0.542 1.892
Turkey 0.200 0.206 2.582
Ukraine 0.288 0.173 7.237
United Kingdom 0.969 0.890 9.165
United States 1.315 0.829 19.189
Zambia 0.078 0.122 0.332
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Table A3: Financial development and industry-level pollution per capita
Dependent variable CO2 emissions
per capita
Growth in value
added
CO2 emissions
per value added
(1) (2) (3)
Log (Credit/GDP + Stocks/GDP) 0.1026*** 0.1484 -0.1845
× Pollution intensity (0.0242) (0.1850) (0.2015)
Log (Stocks/GDP / Credit/GDP) -0.0197** -0.0609 -0.4960**
× Pollution intensity (0.0083) (0.0631) (0.1476)
Industry share 0.0146*** -0.0932*** -0.0004
(0.0048) (0.0135) (0.0068)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 8,288 8,382 7,867
R-squared 0.771 0.549 0.850
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. In column (1), the dependent variable is ‘CO2 emissions
per capita’ which denotes the industrys emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons, per capita; in column (2), the dependent
variable is ‘Growth in value added’ which denotes the industry’s annual growth in value added; and in column (3),
the dependent variable is ‘CO2 emissions per value added’ which denotes the industry’s emissions of carbon dioxide,
in tons, per unit of value added. Industry-specific data come from IEA and UNIDO. All regressions include fixed
effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the country-year level are included in parentheses, where ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all
variable definitions.
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Table A4: Finance and industry-level pollution: Controlling for fuel subsidies
Dependent variable CO2 emissions
per capita
Growth in
value added
CO2 emissions
per value added
(1) (2) (3)
Credit/GDP × Pollution intensity 0.1986*** 0.2490* 0.5105*
(0.0488) (0.1715) (0.3016)
Stocks/GDP × Pollution intensity -0.1022** -0.1854 -1.0517***
(0.0436) (0.1508) (0.2391)
Credit/GDP × Fuel subsidies 0.0001** -0.0051 -0.0057
(0.0000) (0.0045) (0.0058)
Stocks/GDP × Fuel subsidies 0.0001** -0.0019 -0.0129**
(0.00002) (0.0037) (0.0060)
Industry share 0.0144*** -0.0986*** 0.0011
(0.0048) (0.0149) (0.0072)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 7,981 8,040 7,564
R-squared 0.775 0.551 0.846
Notes: The table reports estimates from OLS regressions. In column (1), the dependent variable is ‘CO2
emissions per capita’ which denotes the industry’s emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons, per capita; in column (2),
the dependent variable is ‘Growth in value added’ which denotes the industry’s annual growth in value added;
and in column (3), the dependent variable is ‘CO2 emissions per value added’ which denotes the industry’s
emissions of carbon dioxide, in tons, per unit of value added. Industry-specific data come from UNIDO. All
regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the country-year level are included in
parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical level, respectively.
Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Table A5: Financial development and green innovation
Dependent variable Total patents
per capita
Green patents
per capita
Green patents
per capita (excl.
transport and
waste)
Green patents
per capita
(energy intensive
sectors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit/GDP -0.7551 -0.0732 -0.4770 -0.8420
× Pollution intensity (0.9489) (0.7532) (0.7518) (1.0091)
Stocks/GDP 3.0516** 1.0799* 2.2915*** 0.6348
× Pollution intensity (1.2468) (0.6843) (0.7718) (0.7972)
Industry share 0.1081** 0.0085* 0.0197*** 0.0862*
(0.0489) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0508)
Country × Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Observations 1,524 3,147 3,002 2,849
Pseudo R-squared 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450
Notes: The table reports estimates from Logit regressions. The dependent variable is the number of total patents in a
country-industry-year, per 1 mln. population (column (1)); the number of green patents in a country-industry-year, per 1 mln.
population (column (2)); the number of patents in the most climate-change-intensive technologies in a country-industry-year,
per 1 mln. population, excluding patents related to transportation and to wastewater treatment and waste management (column
(3)); and the number of patents in energy-intensive sectors in a country-industry-year, per 1 mln. population (column (4)).
Industry-specific data come from UNIDO. All regressions include fixed effects as specified. Standard errors clustered at the
country-year level are included in parentheses, where ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical
level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
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Chart 1: Credit markets and stock markets over time
Notes: The chart plots sample-average Private credit / GDP and Stock market capitalization / GDP between 1974 and 2013.
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Chart 2: Pollution intensity vs. external financial dependence
Notes: The chart plots industry-level external finance dependence (horizontal axis) against pollution intensity (vertical axis).
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